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Figure 1. The most iconic and famous product of Amelinckx: the banalized housing slab
Source: Amelinckx – Bien vivre dans son appartement.
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1. Private mass housing and the metropolitan
condition in Belgium
1 The post-war suburban fringes of the Belgian cities are quickly becoming part of history
these days. If until recently the single family home, a car and two children was the widely
divided housing ideal for many, these imaginaries, together with the historical expression
thereof, are quickly aging. Cities like Ghent and Antwerp are studying the older suburban
fringes as the next frontier of urban renewal, earmarking well located older suburbs as
the ideal place for targeted densification and sustainable retrofitting efforts (Grafe et al.,
2014). As public authorities begin to study these areas, it becomes manifest how little is
known regarding the actual dynamics that historically shaped these areas. The planning
history describes the great polarization between the development of,  often self-built,
single family homes and the rather marginal production of public housing estates (De
Meulder et.al, 1999; De Vos, 2008; De Caigny, 2010; Van Herck et.al., 2006; Smets, 1977).
Apart from a few well-published examples such as Cité Moderne (Braem), Kiel (Braem),
Luchtbal (Van Kuyck), Cité de Droixhe (Groupe EGAU), Watersportbaan (G.Bontinck), true
public mass housing schemes remained very limited in scope. Moreover, despite direct
state subsidies for infrastructure, public space and public facilities, these social housing
projects have been criticized for their limited impact on their immediate surroundings
and on housing  policies  in  general  (De  Meulder  et  al.,  1999).  As  such,  the  1949  law
Brunfaut  on  social  housing  that  undergirded  the  public  financing  of  these  projects,
played a minor role in the process of urbanization as it failed to deliver its true ambition
of converting the urban agglomerations in Belgium into consolidated metropolitan areas.
In 1989 social housing barely represented 5% of the total housing stock in Belgium, as
opposed to 30% in surrounding countries (Peeters & Dedecker, 1997). 
2 This paper in contrast focusses on the development of private high rise estates that in the
Belgian context contributed far more significantly to the production of housing for the
masses than the collective complexes produced by the public sector. This paper focusses
on this specific housing segment in order to study the emergence of a public-private
modus operandi that turned out to be decisive for the way in which the urban fringes of
many Belgian cities have been shaped. This private production will be illustrated through
the work of two pioneers of the Belgian property boom: Jean-Florian Collin (Etrimo, 1949;
Etrimo,  1963)  and  François  Amelinckx  (Amelinckx  n.v.).  These  tycoons  are  mostly
remembered for the production of utterly banal standardized housing slabs. They have
been mainly the subject of critique and as the counterpoint of the qualitative production
of the modernist masters (Braem, 1968). As they operated by and large outside of the
well-known public policy context of key Belgian housing laws, few attempts have been
made to put their activities into a broader context, apart from some notable exceptions
(Ledent, 2014).
3 The general introduction of the activities of these two players is followed by a detailed
reconstruction by the activities of one of them, François Amelinckx in his home town
Antwerp. Piecing together a variety of material (ranging from Collin’s manifestos (Collin,
1938; Etrimo, 1963; Collin, 1968) to socio-economic data retrieved from archival material)
five  tableaux  are  constructed  that  characterize  the  shifting  ways  of  working  of  this
Antwerp  contractor.  These  five  descriptions  do  not  add  up  to  a  clear-cut  historical
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chronology, but rather document a range of partly simultaneous and gradually shifting
practices of housing production. 
4 The  paper  reconstructs  the  changing  public-private  constellations  in  which  these
property tycoons contributed to the production of the metropolitan condition in Belgium
and in a policy context that was increasingly deprived of an overall spatial image-guide. If
the public housing law of 1949 was intended to promote the integrated development of
the metropolitan area, in reality the production of public housing targeted a residual
fraction, leaving the lion’s share of mass housing production to the market. 
5 The activities of Amelinckx in Antwerp show an opportunistic interaction between the
entrepreneurial  logic  of  the  firm  and  the  territorially  divided  landscape  of  local
authorities  right  outside  the  19th  century  walls,  each  working  through  their  own
agendas.  The  metropolitan  area  in  turn  was  shaped  through  the  specific  interplay
between  a  rising  real  estate  sector  and  local  authorities  within  various  unfolding
dynamics  of  urbanization:  leaving  a  mixed  historical  legacy  of  urban  surplus  value
derived from the ad hoc combinations made in the process on the one hand, however,
showing an emerging collective failure in terms of a growing inability to make future
oriented investment and to secure the (sustainable) reproduction of the urban areas in
the making.
 
2. Pioneers of private apartment building: Jean-Florian
Collin and François Amelinckx
 
Figure 2 (a). Jean-Florian Collin (1904-1985) 
Sources: Deroy David – Mr. Etrimo and ‘François Amelinckx’ – Zie Magazine.
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Figure 2 (b). François Amelinckx (1898-1975)
Sources: Deroy David – Mr. Etrimo and ‘François Amelinckx’ – Zie Magazine.
6 Although  Jean-Florian  Collin  and  François  Amelinckx  were  brothers  in  arms  in  the
Belgian real estate business, Collin may be characterized as the real pioneer. After some
early experiments in the interwar period, he founded the company Etrimo n.v. (Société
D’Etudes et de Réalisations Immobilières) as early as 1935 (Etrimo, 1963). One year later,
in 1936, François Amelinckx followed in his footsteps, founding his firm Amelinckx n.v.. For
Collin, the aspect of research and study was essential and he regularly published articles
and  books  to  refine  and  explain  his  ideas  on  homeownership,  society  and  property
development.  François  Amelinckx  on  the  contrary,  has  been  profiled  as  a  simple
contractor that was interested in little more than building housing units (Van Hulle, 2000;
Loris, 1976).
7 In 1955, Collin founded the U.P.C.L. (Union Professionel des Créateurs de Lotissements et
de Logements), a Belgian association defending the interests of the real estate business
(Etrimo, 1963). Collin served as its first president. Three years later, in 1958, he moved on
and  founded  the  U.E.C.L.  (Union  Européen  des  Constructeurs  de  Logements,  secteur
privé), an international association with alleged scientific goals, investigating different
modes  of  private  housing  production  within  the  diversified  economic,  juridical  and
political contexts of several countries throughout Europe (UECL, 1960?; UECL, 2010). Such
an international turn was a logical next step in the sequence of earlier evolutions in the
liberal Europe of the fifties, with the unified European coal and steel market in 1951 and
the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 as main examples. Collin
acted as president of the U.E.C.L. and asked Amelinckx to replace him at the U.P.C.L.
(Etrimo, 1963).
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8 Collin was one of the founding fathers of an up-and-coming sector in Europe, the cradle
of which appears to have been lying (and still lies) in Brussels. He rose to become one of
the biggest property tycoons in Europe at that time. In a 1969 interview, Collin boasted to
aim for 9.000 finished apartments per year in the near future (Deroy & Frances, 2013;
Deroy & Frances,  2014).  Barely  one  year  later,  however,  in  1970,  he  went  bankrupt,
causing major upheaval in the Belgian economy that affected small contractors and small
private  savers/investors.  In  a  documentary  of  that  time  no  less  than  9  reasons  are
mentioned to explain Etrimo’s failing,  all  of them addressing major shifts in building
conjuncture and (inter)national economy (BRT, 1970). 
9 François Amelinckx at first managed to survive this crisis and took over the majority of
Collin’s unfinished and ongoing projects (Van Impe, 2013). From that moment onwards,
he  was  Belgian’s  uncontested  number  one  tycoon.  By  the  mid-seventies,  his  firm
employed more than 2,200 people and consistently produced 4,000+ apartments each
year. In his only public interview he bragged: ‘That’s 14 apartments each working day or 1
fully-equipped apartment each 45 working minutes’  (François Amelinckx,  1970).  Mass
production par excellence. After François Amelinckx’s death in 1975, the firm remained
active under the leadership of his protégé Renaat Blyweert, totalling a staggering 45,000
apartments (BRT, 1985), until a new building crisis caused the firm’s collapse in 1986.
 
Figure 3 (a). Information Brochures and publicity from the golden ‘60’s by Amelinckx
Sources: Amelinckx – Bien Vivre dans son appartement
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Figure 3 (b). Information Brochures and publicity from the golden ‘60’s by Etrimo
Sources: Etrimo – Comment devenir propriétaire.
10 Taken together, these two giant tycoons alone built approximately 65.000 apartments,
enough units to house over 200.000 people, the population of a city the size of Ghent.
Even  if  these  numbers  trigger  the  imagination,  little  remains  known  of  the  precise
political-economic context within which they acted. Through a thorough reconstruction
of Amelinckx’s building practices in Antwerp, this paper reconstructs the public-private
deals in which these tycoons were involved, and in what sense their housing production
contributed to the process of urbanizing both the urban core and its as yet rural suburbs
(Rémy, 1974).
 
3. Amelinckx in Antwerp: fifty years of building activity
in five tableaus
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Tableau 1. The Bourgeois Boulevard and representative City Expansion
Source: Antwerp City Archives, ﬁle n° sa028126.
11 François Amelinckx was a 12-year old boy, when in 1910 the City Architect of Paris Henri
Prost  won  the  international  design  competition  for  the  redevelopment  of  the  old
ramparts in Antwerp (Studiecommissie ter inrichting van de Antwerpsche agglomeratie, 1910).
Little did he know that this symbolic event would set in motion a series of urbanization
processes  that  were  going  to  provide  him  with  numerous  building  opportunities.  A
territory that until then had been a collection of separate and mainly rural municipalities
became in no time the subject of urban speculation. Although Prost’s plan produced quite
a lot of enthusiasm among planning professionals, it was quickly abandoned. The plan
did, however, bring the question of a Greater Antwerp on top of the political agenda and
stirred the public imagination.
12 The ‘Study Committee for a Greater Antwerp’ that had organized the design competition
resumed its activities shortly after the event. One of its very first achievements was the
construction of the Jan Van Rijswijck Avenue that connected the city-center with the
main road to Brussels. Planned already in 1907, its construction only began to take shape
in the 1920s following the announcement that the 1930 World Fair would be hosted along
the new avenue (ACA, 1908). Given the previous failure to get development along the
avenue of the ground, a number of strategic lots were given special attention. It is at one
of these iconic spots, at the far end of the Avenue welcoming visitors from Brussels, that
François Amelinckx in 1928 would develop his first apartment building in Antwerp (ACA,
1929).  The  development  of  the  avenue was  regarded as  representative  of  the  future
agglomeration and its construction must be understood in relation to Brussels’ many new
avenues that emerged in that same period. Buildings along the Van Rijswijck avenue were
subject to approval by a board of architects (ACA, 1929). To this end, Amelinckx entrusted
the  design  of  the  building  to  Marcel  Segers,  a  prominent  Antwerp  architect  that
associated on a regular basis with the famous Belgian modernist Renaat Braem at that
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time (Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed, 2013).  The Building on the opposite side of the
street was designed by Louis-Herman De Koninck, a leading Belgian architect of that time
and living in Brussels.
13 As the son of a family that had a business in building-materials, Amelinckx was only one
among many capitalists that invested in real estate along the Van Rijswijck avenue. After
the first world war, an impoverished bourgeoisie emerged that was no longer able to
maintain their living standards in their large fully-staffed hotels but was not ready to give
up  the  representative  decorum  of  their previous  lifestyle  (Delhaye,  1946).  Many
industrialists  and  capitalists  started  small  development  companies  to  provide  this
emerging niche market with vast apartments along spacious boulevards mimicking the
Parisian grandeur of  the Belle  Epoque.  Along the Van Rijswijck Avenue,  these private
entrepreneurs not only bought their plots from the city of Antwerp, but also co-financed
the construction of the public domain, including a full package of utilities systems (water,
gas, sewerage and electricity) (ACA, 1929) that was indispensable for their high-standard
products and equally brought a wider suburban area in reach of modernity 
14 In retrospect, François Amelinckx’s first investment tried to capitalize on an emerging
‘bourgeois urbanism’ and the promise of economic growth resulting from the world-fair.
It  took  form  within  a  climate  of  unqualified  optimism  that  seems  to  have  blinded
Amelinckx, as it did so many others. His first complex contained 33 rental apartments and
3 shops for fair visitors. Only a few months after the event had ended, the building was
standing largely empty in a peri-urban desert (ACA, 1929). Moreover, a dramatic fire in
1937  turned  his  first  investment  into  a  true  disaster  (ACA,  1929).  The  very  difficult
building process with endless negotiations didn’t help either, but it formed the young
Amelinckx as  a  political  man,  ready to fight.  Despite the young age of  30,  he didn’t
hesitate to directly address the socialist mayor Camille Huysmans to arrange his affairs
(ACA, 1929). His political guts and subsequent connections to high-ranked people within
the B.S.P. (Belgian Socialist Party) would serve him in his later career.
 
Figure 4. Amelinckx between prominent architects at the Jan Van Rijswijcklaan
Source: Antwerp City Archives – imagebank.
15 Collin’s  early  art-deco experiments  in  Brussels suffered  the  same  fate.  He faced
bankruptcy for the first time in the early thirties (Deroy & Frances, 2013). These events,
however, would not temper Collin’s nor Amelinckx’s optimism. On the contrary, both
founded new companies in full building recession, respectively in 1935 and 1936. The
remarkable book “L’épargne immobilière et sa fonction sociale” of 1938 proves Collin had
been developing a clear line of thought. The book shows Collin’s profound understanding
of  the  strong  link  between  the  politics  of  capital  accumulation  and  the  subsequent
processes of urbanization. Delving into the history of English building societies, he had
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learned that the success of a development company depended upon a critical mass of
customers. The more capital could be accumulated, Collin explained, the more (external)
surplus value could be generated within the process of urbanization. As such, involving
the social and middle-classes, a significant amount of collectively accumulated capital
would not only pay for more private housing, but could cover the costs of all sorts of
public utilities as well. In short, if managed well, the program he suggested would be able
to realize a plan harmonique d’urbanisme unique au monde. Collin believed that a new 1938
law that allowed private building companies to accumulate private savings could become
the decisive link that could turn the lower and middle-classes into future metropolitan
apartment-dwellers. In his book, the emerging scene of planning professionals, architects
and public authorities were asked to develop a national urban framework for which the
consolidated metropolis seems to have been the image-guide. As such, Collin was aiming
at  the  installation  of  a  public-private  practice  of  property  and  urban  development,
exploring working methods that sound surprisingly fresh today compared to current
everyday practice.
 
Tableau 2: “La Métropole Radieuse”1 for the middle classes
Note: Entire streets of repetitive row houses in the metropolitan suburbs of Antwerp. Excerpt of
building application by Amelinckx for the Oosterveldlaan in the suburb of Wilrijk
Source: Antwerp City Archives ﬁle n° 238#740.
16 In 1948 the Belgian parliament passed the ‘De Taeye’  housing law which shaped the
postwar urban landscape in a decisive manner. Part and parcel of post-war politics of
economic recovery, the law installed a broad package of financial incentives to produce a
new generation of homeowners (Theunis,  2006).  Since no maximal income rates were
determined, the law made it possible for both the lower and upper middle classes to buy
or build their own individual house, providing premiums and loans under state guarantee
up to 100% of the fair market value of the house on top of a broad range of tax benefits
(Theunis, 2006). Immediately, Jean-Florian Collin sounded the alarm. He had always been
strongly opposed to state-interference in the regular housing market.  For Collin,  the
state’s only task should be to provide social housing for the residual and most needy
fraction in society. However, the new law targeted the middle classes as well. As such, it
directly threatened Collin’s ambitions to expand his activities towards the same target
audience. His main objection was that the law applied for single-family houses only and
excluded the development of apartments which had been the core-business of property
tycoons in the interwar days. The law was inspired by a Christian-Democratic ideology
that saw the suburbanized nuclear family as the corner stone of the post-war welfare
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state.  Because  the  law  came  without  any  spatial  policy,  and  despite  the  fact  that
premiums were slightly raised in metropolitan areas to cover higher land values, nothing
prevented most of the houses from emerging at any place throughout suburbia. In short,
after WWII,  both the apartment building as a housing typology and the metropolitan
region as an evident field of action were under pressure. To make matters worse, an
incessant skepticism towards private capital accumulation had already put a term to the
1938 law Collin was hoping to rely on (Kermis, 1948).
17 Collin’s  reaction however was firm and came quickly,  as  he founded “Etrimo Social”
(Etrimo, 1949a) and “Etrimo Classes Moyennes” (Etrimo, 1949b) in 1949. The first one
complied fully within the outlines of the 1948 housing law, but falsely suggested that its
main target audience was a social class. The latter, on the contrary, left little room for
interpretation: middle classes ought to live in metropolitan apartments, rationalized and
modernized descendants from their bourgeois ancestors. In a struggle for clients, Collin
didn’t come any further than closing a deal with the mortgage bank CGER that allowed
buyers of apartments to get maximum loans of 50% of the fair market value, without any
state guarantee or extra tax benefits (Etrimo, 1949b). This didn’t even come close to the
financial incentives and benefits from the 1948 law. Even if they had wanted, property
tycoons could hardly even give their apartments away at that time.
18 No surprise that both Collin and Amelinckx started to build single-family houses. In the
case of François Amelinckx in Antwerp, we can trace these experiments back to a couple
of typical streets in the municipality of Wilrijk. Although Amelinckx was clearly surfing
on the waves of the De Taeye Law, he stayed focused on the metropolitan territory he had
been working in so far. The firm bought its plots from a tract developer called Extensa
that had been founded in 1910 by the noble family Della Faille in the slipstream of the
competition for a « Greater Antwerp » (Extensa, 1960). For them the time was right to add
value to the soaring land value of their estates. In order to prepare their land for building
activity, the firm financed the construction of an extensive road network according to a
plan that they had asked engineer August Mennes to develop (EPA, 1930?). 
19 It must not come as a surprise that the 1948 law helped boost the activities of these tract
developers. Since new residents equaled higher tax returns, many municipalities made
specific construction plans to attract as many De-Taeye-dwellings as possible (Theunis,
2006). Often, as was the case in Wilrijk, municipalities relied upon older plans from the
interwar period to speed up the development process. Here, the old Mennes-plan was
hastily recovered and Amelinckx provided a few entire streets with single-family houses
(ACA, 1958a). In this experiment, Amelinckx only played a minor role in a much bigger
public-private development deal between Extensa and several municipalities. Perhaps one
of  the  reasons  he  hardly  ever  built  single  family  houses  again  in  the  Antwerp
metropolitan region can be found in the fact that intermediate tract developers such as
Extensa already possessed most of the strategic plots and took too big a portion of the
profit margin away.
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Tableau 3: Inner-city metropolisation: countering the Suburban Dream
“La Ville Urbanisée”: replacing bourgeois row-houses with apartment buildings at the Britselei in
Antwerp. To the left, a new complex by Amelinckx is under construction.
Source: Antwerp City Archives, ﬁle 004216.
20 Initially, the 1948 housing law was only intended to last for the first 50.000 premiums.
Because of its enduring success, however, it was prolonged twice in 1950 and 1955, each
time for an additional 5 years (Theunis, 2006). This law had virtually decimated Collin’s
would-be clientele and he by now understood that he was not going to win this battle all
by himself. In 1955, when the 1948 law was prolonged for the second time already, Collin
felt that the time had come to take matters in his own hands. He founded the U.P.C.L
(Union professionnelle des constructeurs de logements) a national union for real estate
developers.  Relying  on  slogans  such  as  “A  people  can  only  be  powerful  if  it’s  well
organized”,  its  mission could hardly be misunderstood (Etrimo,  1963).  From now on,
Belgian “Home-Builders” would claim their market share through intense and organized
lobbying for customers on a national scale. But Collin had some more magic up his sleeve,
as he managed to close a break-through deal  with the biggest mortgage company in
Belgium (le Crédit Hypothécaire et Immobilier de Belgique), granting all clients loans up
to 80% of the fair market value of their future apartment (Etrimo, 1963). In retrospect, the
year 1955 can be understood as the year in which Collin decided not to wait any longer
for a public sector that never catered to his entrepreneurial ambitions and ideas. Instead,
he set his own rules and mechanisms, paving the way for his fellow home-builders. 
21 This « uprising of the property tycoons » occurred within two years after an important
law on slum clearance (1953) had been passed (Heyns, 2006). State subsidies enabled local
authorities to expropriate and clear slums without subjecting the cleared plots to specific
conditions  of  re-use.  Being  more  concerned  with  urban  redevelopment  than  with
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reallocating slum dwellers, this law soon introduced a generalized practice of inner-city
demolition,  that  stretched  far  beyond  the  ‘slum  areas’  themselves  (Heyns,  2006).  In
addition to an intensifying process of  urban flight,  these conditions explain how the
recently organized sector of property tycoons lobbied its way into the devaluated land
market of the urban core.
22 In Antwerp, more specifically, this period coincided with a costly 10-year plan that post-
war and socialist mayor Craeybeckx had launched for the revitalization of the Antwerp
harbor  (1955-1965),  cutting  deep  into  city  budgets  despite  state  funding  (Theunisse,
1973).  What’s more, ill-negotiated prewar conventions between the city and the state
about the Antwerp port had left the cities’  finances in a very bad condition.  In 1936
already, alderman Delwaide had stated during a municipal council: “The harbor is urban
property. This property is not managed by a company’s capitals but by the collective
responsibility  of  the  Antwerp  community.  And  this  is  a  treacherous  and  dangerous
situation. If our population decreases, the financial resistance of our harbor will equally
diminish. We can only expand our harbour when the communities’ base enlarges. That is
why we propose to recollect the suburbs into a Greater-Antwerp administrative unit”
(‘Groot Antwerpen’, 1941). Although such a merger only briefly existed during the war
years  under  German occupation,  and  the  1948  housing  law had only  intensified  the
process of urban flight, the postwar 10-year plan nevertheless initiated a period of radical
expansion of  the Antwerp port.  In short,  the city  could not  afford to lose its  entire
population to the suburbs and was desperate to keep and attract taxable income-classes
into its core. As a consequence, inner-city demolition, commodification and densification
ultimately seem to have become profitable and indispensable mechanisms to keep the
cities’ finances in balance. 
23 This variety of conditions explains how Amelinckx was able to jump on the bandwagon
and become highly active in the city center, transforming former bourgeois boulevards
into densified metropolitan avenues for lower and middle-class masses. A mostly French-
speaking bourgeoisie easily found its way to outer city villa-parks that firms such as
Extensa developed anyway (Extensa Private Archives, 1910-1985). Craeybeckx -a notorious
Flemish-nationalist  and  explicitly  opposed  to  the  legacy  of  100  years  of  bourgeois
democracy in Belgium (Craeybeckx, 1930) - seemed hardly bothered by the destruction of
this bourgeois heritage that by no means qualified as slums.
24 For more than 20 years, the Antwerp core remained Amelinckx’ preferred field of action.
The extent to which his activities were related to existing networks of public transport is
striking.  The firm mainly built  on avenues that  were served by tramways,  providing
offices and commercial spaces on lower floors and housing on the upper floors. From the
sixties  onwards,  implementation  schemes  for  a  subway  system  throughout  the  city
suggest that this correlation was not entirely unintentional. Cross sections of a typical
avenue not  only  show adaptations  of  traffic  flows and the implementation of  public
transport, but equally depict a densification and heightening of the adjacent buildings
(Van Den Broeck et.al., 2015).
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Figure 5. Proposal for introducing tram- and subway systems in the boulevard section in Antwerp
Note : Equally suggests the heightening of existing row houses.
Source: Van Den Broeck, Jef, et.al.- Maatschappij, ruimtelijk plannen en beleid, Antwerpen herwonnen
stad? 1940-2012.
25 The  sudden  growth  of  Amelinckx’s  activities  from  the  mid-fifties  onwards  (ACA.,
1956-1964)  must  be  understood  within  these  outlines.  As  a  prominent  member  of  a
lobbying sector and in the slipstream of a law on slum-clearance, Amelinckx was able to
capture a significant portion of the lower and middle-class market along the inner-city
boulevards in Antwerp. Whereas Collin had suggested to co-finance entirely new urban
ensembles including public infrastructures, little remained of these urban aspirations in
the postwar era. Amelinckx merely capitalized on a pre-existing urban context to cash
the growing residual land values without creating much additional urban value. At most,
it could be claimed that this process of densification provided the necessary critical mass
in  terms  of  square  meters  of  housing  and  commercial  space  to  justify  the  further
expansion of the tram and subway-system.
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Tableau 4. Stacking the middle classes in suburbia
Source: Götzfried (1980).
26 The minute he became the president of the U.P.C.L. in 1958, Amelinckx acted like a raging
bull in a china shop. By then, he had become a (silent) member of the Belgian Socialist
Party (B.S.P.) and seems to have been well-networked in national Belgian politics (ACA,
1954-1964). It was from this somewhat ambivalent, but strategic position, that Amelinckx
raised several delicate topics.
27 First of all, Amelinckx aimed to put an end to the De-Taeye-premiums as was foreseen in
1960. In his view, apartments and single-family houses had to get equal state-support
(ACA, 1956-1964). Furthermore, and that was new, he brought charges against what he
stated to be unlawful practices in social housing policy (ACA, 1956-1964). As the president
of the U.P.C.L. Amelinckx did not hesitate to name high ranked politicians who owned a
‘social  apartment’.  He  openly  stated  that  social  housing  companies  in  the  big
agglomerations were mainly building for a bourgeois class. Amelinckx set the Avenue Jan
De Vos in Antwerp as a clear example, where, according to him, more than 80% of the
social  flats  were  sold  to  people  with  much  higher  incomes  than  what  was  legally
permitted (ACA, 1956-1964). Apart from that, and more generally, Amelinckx ridiculed
the  1949  law of  Brunfaut,  as  he  claimed it  was  a  money-wasting  law that  was  only
intended to be a playground for several architects (ACA, 1956-1964).
28 Given these circumstances, it is nevertheless remarkable that at this stage, the private
sector  reached  out  to  the  public  sector  again.  Referring  to  examples  in  France  and
Germany, Amelinckx proposed to organize public competitions in which different teams
of contractors and prominent architects – he metioned Van Kuyck and Stynen - should
participate in order to obtain the best possible solution at the best possible prices (ACA
1956-1964).  In  1960  however,  the  De-Taeye-premiums for  single-family  housing  were
prolonged  again  (Theunis,  2006)  (as  they  would  be  until  the  late  seventies),  and
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Amelinckx was never invited for any competition. If there ever was any rapprochement
between the real estate and public sector, it happened on the sly,  behind the official
political scenes (Van Hulle, 2000). This can be illustrated in the Antwerp context by what
happened at the Avenue Fruithof in Berchem. 
29 Together with some local entrepreneurs, Amelinckx and Etrimo, again were part of a
much  larger  public-private  deal  between  the  development  firm  Urbana  n.v. and  the
Berchem authorities (Götzfried, 1980).  The firm Urbana n.v. had bought a 43 ha noble
estate from a noble family of which some 3,5 ha were freely ceded to the municipality of
Berchem for the construction of the municipal sports center Het Rooi. The rest of the
land  would  swiftly  transform  from  rural  area  into  a  high-density  residential
neighborhood. As had been the case in Wilrijk, it was again an interwar development plan
of August Mennes that was reconverted into legal construction plans in 1955, mainly
offering space for single-family housing (Götzfried, 1980). The plan contained a part of a
larger  metropolitan  avenue  that  Mennes  had  been  planning  throughout  the  entire
agglomeration. It is on a plot along this Fruithof Avenue that Collin’s Etrimo, without any
permission  and  bluntly  ignoring  the  existing  land-use  plans,  started  to  build  tall
standardized housing slabs from 1960 onwards (ACA, 1955-1965). Again following in his
footsteps, Amelinckx would do exactly the same. As so-called legal plans were adapted
time and again, it could easily be stated that in practice, these property tycoons were de
facto planning this entire area along the way.
 
Figure 6. Original Legal 1955 zoning plan (L) adapted to the slabs of Etrimo and Amelinckx in 1963
(R)
Note : Amelinckx even built 7 slabs straight into what was at ﬁrst a public park (upper left).
Source: Antwerp City Archives – ﬁles 285#114 to 285#120.
30 Again, a socio-economic angle might explain what made these developers get away with
these practices.2 Berchem was one of the many towns at the outskirts of Antwerp that was
very  quickly  transforming  from  a  rural  society  into  an  urbanized  one.  Since  1959
however,  at  the eve of  the construction of  the Fruithoflaan and more generally at  a
moment Berchem needed to take an urban leap forward,  a new law determined that
municipalities  could  no  longer  receive  direct  state  subsidies  for  road  constructions
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(Theunisse,  1973).  As  such,  local  authorities  in  the  Antwerp  agglomeration  became
increasingly dependent upon loans and the accumulation of their own resources to cope
with increasing costs of urbanization (Theunisse, 1973). Thanks to the slabs of Collin and
Amelinckx, it only took fifteen years to transform a piece of farmland into a metropolitan
parkland  that  accommodated  some  10.000  taxable  middle  class  inhabitants,  while
establishing a more open and green urban scheme that required less infrastructure than
the original 1955 legal zoning plans. Standardization and mass-production had been key
research questions (UECL, 2010) ever since Collin founded the U.E.C.L. and it seems not
only property tycoons themselves benefited from them.
 
Figure 7. “Le rural urbanisé”: standardization and mass production transform the rural countryside
into a premature metropolitan area
Source: Götzfried (1980).
31 In  a  recent  comparison,  the  Avenue  Jan  De  Vos  has  been contrasted,  by  Bruno  De
Meulder, as a preachy effort of social engineering to the Avenue Fruithof that symbolizes
a jaunty and pleasurable ‘American way of  life’  (De Meulder,  2006).  Although mainly
conceived as housing for a ‘social middle class’, newspaper articles proclaimed the avenue
as the most  beautiful  and modern one of  the entire agglomeration (Götzfried,  1980).
Especially Collin’s Mercator Park highly contributed to the pleasant perception of a park
city, as its 70 meters wide landscaped gardens visually relate the green Fruithof Avenue
to the Rooi sports fields further on. As such, Collin’s project provided the area with an
extensive  metropolitan  horizon  for  the  benefits  of  all.  Arguably,  the  density  that
Amelinckx  added  afterwards  stimulated  the  advent  of  a  broad  range  of  shops  and
facilities serving a large part of the Antwerp suburb. It quickly became a vibrant and
desirable neighborhood. For a while, the optimism of these property tycoons seemed to
have managed to deliver their radiant suburban promises at the Fruithof Ave. All that was
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needed was an urban scheme of a large green boulevard as a collective interface between
these standardized housing slabs. Today, however, the avenue seems to have passed its
peak,  as  an  increasing  amount  of  commercial  spaces  are  standing  empty  and  poor
maintenance standards have left these housing estates with major physical and energetic
challenges.
 
Tableau 5. Parasitic slabs along the highway
Housing complexes as solitary parasitic inserts into a pre-existing urban fabric. Consuming the urban
rather than producing it.
Source: Van Acker, Maarten – From flux to frame, Designing infrastructure and shaping urbanization
in Belgium
32 Half a century after the decision was taken to tear down the old ramparts around the city,
a lion’s share of these fortification walls were still standing (De Bruyne et.al., 2009; ACA,
1937).  Tearing  down  the  whole  construction,  filling  up  the  moats  and  levelling  the
terrains was simply too expensive to finance with the expected property incomes of the
in itself  costly BelleEpoque boulevards that had been projected by the 1910 Prost plan
(ACA, 1937). This made that nothing much happened, and the ramparts remained terrain
vague until the late fifties.
33 It should not come as a surprise that a crafty fox like Amelinckx saw the opportunity in
this  vague  terrain.  A  specific  clause  in  the  Antwerp  building  code  stipulated  that
exceptions in height and building typology could be made on ‘particular’ plots that had
no clear relation to the existing urban fabric (ACA, 1958b). All terrains adjacent to the old
ramparts complied with these rules. Things gained momentum with the 1958 decision to
construct a national ring road on the old ramparts (Van Acker, 2014). Left-overs of state
property along the construction site that had been in a financial grid-lock for more than
50  years  were  bought  up  by  François  Amelinckx.  As  early  as  1958,  he  would  insert
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freestanding  slabs on seemingly  lost  plots  along  the future  highway.  On remarkable
footage of festivities celebrating the grand opening of the ring-road, Amelinckx buildings
appear as true billboards of the reigning optimism of the time (De Bruyne et.al., 2009).
34 These slabs represent Amelinckx’s most commonly known part of housing production
and they would become instructive for  ‘parasitic’  planning policy  of  the firm in the
seventies.  A  policy  that  no  longer  required  any  involvement  in  any  urban  scheme
whatsoever.  Standardized  slabs  were  simply  injected  into  a  pre-existing,  preferably
diversified  but  often  unconsolidated  urban  fabric  (Loris,  1976;  Blyweert,  1975).  The
production of ‘Grands-ensembles’ with the agglomeration of Sarcelles as ultimate specter,
had to be avoided at all cost. Finite compositions of maximum 3 to 5 slabs in reach of
facilities and submerged in a finely grained and low-rise suburban fabric, became the
firm’s predominant modus operandi (Loris, 1976; Blyweert, 1975). Hardly any ambitions
to contribute to the development of new forms of city-ness were left. The Amelinckx-
slabs merely became opportunistic inserts in the unfolding process of urbanization. 
35 This  rather  parasitic  position  towards  the  city  becomes  apparent  in  several
advertisements  that  were  published  by  Amelinkcx  throughout  the  seventies.  An add
called  “Some  people live  close  to  their  work.  And  You?”  suggests  urban  proximity
praising the strategic location of the dwelling units, next to all kinds of services, shopping
centers and employment. However, the image of a solitary tower watchman somewhere
in the middle of nowhere hardly evokes any urbanity at all. While well located within the
urban network, the Amelinkcx-flats had no longer any ambition to contribute to the city
as a collective arrangement and as a built fabric. The same ‘parasitic’ logic is at work in a
remarkable  series  of  brochures  called  ‘InfoAmelinckx’  (Amelinckx,  1973-1980).  The
booklets are a lyrical panegyric to the rich historical legacy of the urban cores around
which the company operates. The apartments themselves are barely part of these stories
and only appear in a separate insert in the middle of the brochures, as if they never really
want to become part of the context that nevertheless gives them luster. Inhabitants of
these slabs seem to be no longer treated as true citizens, but as tourists living in their
own city (Van Hulle, 2000).
 
Figure 8. Some people live close to their work. And you? Urban proximity devoid of urbanity (L).
Excerpt from InfoAmelinckx (R)
Note: The sudden insert of Amelinckx products and publicity in the middle of a panegyric of the
historical city can be understood as a metaphor for the position of the Amelinckx slabs within the
urban fabric.
Source: PVV liberal party – PVV magazine n° 58 and Amelinckx – InfoAmelinckx
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36 In the case of Antwerp, this parasitic logic is clearly illustrated on a plot of land along the
ring road in Berchem. Here, a number of standardized slabs were successively copy-
pasted, piece by piece and without any predetermined urban scheme, engaging also other
development firms such as Finspico n.v. along the way. This kind of examples clearly
shows that the random implementation of such slabs was not only a typical Amelinckx-
practice. It became common practice in the real estate business in Belgium.
 
Figure 9. Solitary slabs by Amelinckx and Finspico
Note: These slabs pop up along the highway in Berchem, without any overall urban scheme or
strategy whatsoever between 1964 and 1974; with overabundant, ill-conceived and underused
infrastructure, sports ﬁelds as a result.
Source: drawing by Els Vernimmen, based on several building application ﬁles, Antwerp City Archives,
ﬁles 961#3704 and 961#3157.
37 Yet it must be stressed that the position of these slabs was never as random as may seem.
Most  of  them were not  only adjacent  to the ring-road,  but  were also located in the
vicinity of public transport, benefitting from existing infrastructures. Ever since the De
Taeye-law had been implemented, it had granted subsidies for more than 400.000 private
homes, that were scattered throughout the country (Theunis, 2006). As early as 1974, the
Amelinckx firm stated that in the long future, society no longer would be able to cope
with the incredible collective costs of dispersed utilities systems and absurd commuter
patterns  (Blyweert,  1975).  Remarkably,  the  very  same  arguments  resurfaced  in  the
planning discourse of the late 1990s that accompanied the implementation of the Flemish
Structure Plan (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 1998). However opportunistic
the working logics of firms such as Amelinckx may be, they nevertheless reveal a concern
for a certain kind of spatial thrift.
38 Amelinkcx  has  hardly  ever  built  outside  the  petite  périphérie of  emerging  urban
agglomerations,  always  looking  for  «special»  plots  along  infrastructures  of  public
transport already in place. In doing so, the firm increasingly targeted supposedly «social»
customer classes (François Amelinckx, 1970). In many occasions, men like Amelinckx and
Collin made deals with local authorities to build and sell apartments at «fixed» prices for
a  «social»  public  (Collin,  1964).  To  guarantee  normal  profit  margins,  municipalities
provided them with strategic plots at reduced prices. On some occasions the agreements
included the construction of  facilities  such as  kindergartens or supermarkets  (Collin,
1964; Loris, 1976). This kind of quick deals seems to have been a lot more flexible and
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effective than applying for the ’49 social housing law with its often long thus expensive
bureaucratic trajectories (De Meulder et al., 1999). On some occasions local governments
even consulted social housing companies to verify whether these private projects met the
standards of social housing (ACA, 1972).
39 Similarly, in this latest stage, Amelinckx hinted at possible ways of interaction with the
public sector,  referring to the French initiative of the Plan-Construction that had been
launched in  1971  (Loris,  1976).  This  platform gathered  public  authorities,  architects,
sociologists,  researchers,  contractors  and  promotors  encouraging  experiment  and
innovation in  the  field  of  habitat  and housing  construction.  Needless  to  say  that  in
Belgium, no such platform ever came into being. Predominant economic imperatives of
mass production smothered every attempt to intervene both in terms of architecture and
urban planning  as  the  role  of  design  was  reduced  to  nothing  (Loris, 1976).  It  is  no
coincidence  that  in  this  period  prominent  architects  such  as  Renaat  Braem  held
“Hemelinckx and Atrimo” responsible for building the “ugliest country in the world”
(Braem, 1968). Moreover, the architectural scene in general gradually lost its interest in
large-scale  commercial  housing development schemes.  As  a  result,  model  plans were
stacked on sterile ground levels where some miserable greenery didn’t even try to keep
the illusion of a park city alive. Today, these parasitic slabs embody the most comfortless
and  poor  legacy  of  Amelinckx’s  activities.  Although  well-networked  into  the  urban
transport systems,  they are little more than a logistic setting for an everyday life of
«métro-boulot-dodo»  which  was  a  strong  credo  of  the  firm (Blyweert,  1975).  It  was
exactly this  kind of  homogenization and alienation of  everyday life  that  was heavily
critiqued by people as Lefebvre in the late sixties and early seventies (Schmid, 2012).
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Figure 10. Total Amelinckx production in the Antwerp metropolitan region
Note: Although the most iconic product of Amelinckx is the free-standing suburban housing slab, the
lion’s share of his production can surprisingly enough be found in the urban core.
Source: Map by Lisa Stroobandt, based on a digital record of Amelinckx building applications from the
Antwerp City Archives.
 
4. Conclusion: urban fortunes and the collective failure
to amend the process of metropolitan urbanization
40 In the first half of the twentieth century, the Study Committee for a Greater Antwerp that
answered to the Ministry of Public Works, was asked to develop a general framework for
the  city’s  metropolitan  future  (Studiecommissie  ter  inrichting  van  de  Antwerpsche
Agglomeratie, 1910). Amelinckx’s first achievement along the Van Rijswijck Avenue must
be understood within the optimism of this emerging discourse on greater urbanism at the
turn of the 20th century. As it surfaced in a number of studies and national plans, the
expansion of the main metropolitan areas became a pertinent urban question at that time
(Ledent, 1937; Otlet, 1937; Brunfaut, 1951). It was this promise of establishing a national
state urbanism that triggered Collin to link strategies of private capital accumulation and
property development with an overall public planning practice and the mass production
of commercial housing. Through cooperative building societies, the social and middle-
class masses were invited to actively co-produce their own daily environment under state
supervision  within  public-private-partnership  deals  at  a  national  scale  (Collin,  1938).
Collin’s writings at that time breathed a remarkable optimism. Tracing the activities of
real estate development firms such as Amelinckx and Etrimo back to their Interbellum
roots, gives a surprising insight in their efforts to contribute to a broader urban practice
than they are generally accredited for. Looking back at it now, these property tycoons
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seem to have been waiting for a political context and a public sector that in reality would
never cater to their entrepreneurial ambitions.
41 The 1948 De Taeye housing law made an abrupt ending to the utopian optimism of the
interwar days. The law lured away a would-be target audience of these tycoons and came
without any clear spatial idea. Given its focus on premiums and tax benefits, the law can
be understood within a context of post-war economic recovery that soon established an
individualized sprawling suburban landscape. Although these financial regulations gave a
broad middle-class direct access to the post-war welfare state, they were by and large
insufficient to plan that state efficiently in the long run.
42 The  five  tableaus  clearly  show  that  property  tycoons,  in  turn,  never  left  their
metropolitan field of action. Although earlier interwar planning efforts remained on the
table, and were occasionally recollected, they were no longer part of any explicit urban
vision or planning culture. Their building activities mainly became part of various logics
of economic exchange with local authorities. Strongly politically involved, and almost co-
authors of legislative frameworks, property tycoons like Collin and Amelinckx were able
to read the links  between public  and private  capital  flows and interests  in  order  to
capture a significant market of commodified housing. The tableaus follow Amelinckx in
his footsteps and reveal a long history and a broad range of public-private property deals
involving  an anonymous  community  of  developers  and private  investors  that  jointly
shaped  the  Antwerp  metropolis.  It  seems  that  at  that  time,  an  amalgamation  of
mercantile public-private deals were at the very root of urban mutations (Laconte, 1978).
A state-administered metropolitan urbanism of the interwar period had been replaced by
multiple  logics  of  urbanization,  merely  fulfilling  the  direct  (urban)  needs  of  local
authorities. 
43 It must be emphasized however that this local opportunism was at times nonetheless able
to generate urban surplus. The tableaus show that private capital was addressed to cope
with the increasing costs of an urbanizing society and often undergirded public utilities
such as public transport, infrastructure, utility grids, metropolitan landscapes and even
sports centers and commercial main streets, producing unexpected urban fortunes. As
such, a general metropolitan condition surfaced as a positive effect out of a multiplication
of self-contained mercantile arrangements.  Even if  these positive externalities (Rémy,
1966; Dehaene, 2013) established a certain urban state of aggregation, they were never
able to produce a consolidated metropolis. 
44 Nevertheless, it was the private sector itself that denounced the absence of an urban
framework. They understood that the increasing social costs of a welfare-state politics
that had caused an ubiquitous sprawling urban landscape would soon grow out of control.
In  order  to  prevent  this  kind  of  negative  externalities,  well-conceived  planning
frameworks seemed indispensable. The tableaus show that at different occasions and in
different ways, the private sector reached out to the public sector in order to establish
more solid and enduring ways of cooperation. In the end such a rapprochement never
really took place and regardless of the fact whether these initiatives were truly genuine,
it nevertheless sheds a more nuanced light on the legacy of these property tycoons in
terms of urban aspirations.
45 All the same, these property tycoons have not been bothered too much with creating
more  interesting  working  conditions  for  themselves  either.  If  the  tableaus  mark
Amelinckx’s ability to be active within various dynamics of urbanization on different
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spots at the same time, they also reveal him as a man without qualities (Musil, 1999) that
was simply building what the market asked him to. The more Amelinckx was able to build
housing units in suburbia, the more units he was able to subsequently build apartments
in the urban core due to the process of urban flight he had (co-)produced in the first
place. These economic multiplier effects mattered far more for men like Amelinckx than
building  a  consistent  overall  urban  fabric  whatsoever.  Although  in  some  ways  he
contributed to establish some sort of metropolitan structure, avoiding Grands-ensembles
and capitalizing on a pre-existing urban fabric seems to have been an overly optimistic
strategy that only postponed pertinent urban questions to a later stage in the process of
urbanization. A general planning discourse on infrastructural and cost-efficiency alone
clearly didn’t suffice to produce a convincing urbanism on site. The city, in other words,
needs a lot more than a logistic and mercantile credo of métro, boulot, dodo.
46 Finally, the observation must be made that architects, urbanists and planners all seem to
have  failed  to  discern  a  pertinent  urban  project  out  of  the  multiple  dynamics  and
processes that Amelinckx was part of. His simultaneous activities in the urban core and in
several metropolitan suburbs were all  part of the same process of «metropolisation»:
together  these  activities  reflect the  transformation  from  a  “non-urbanized  city  and
countryside” to the “urbanized metropolis”. Although this kind of transformations and
effects of urbanization was at that very moment being theorized by urban sociologists
such as Lefebvre (1970) and Rémy (1966; 1974) and targeting «multiplier effects» seems to
have  been  commonplace  in  real-estate  practice  (Harvey,  1985,  p.85),  planners  and
urbanists all seem to have failed to grasp the shift from an interwar state urbanism to the
multiple post-war dynamics of urbanization that shaped the metropolitan territory of
Antwerp and beyond. This seems to comply with Bernardo Secchi’s assertion that post-
war  urbanists  have  failed  to  grasp the  shift  from the  (stable)  «Modern City»  to  the
(dynamic) «Contemporary City», stating that: “it is not the chaotic nature of the
(contemporary) city that ought to surprise us, but rather our inability or failure to define
each deviation in a sufficiently strict way and within sufficiently enduring timeframes.”
(Secchi, 2006). 
47 This paper highlights the collective failure to embed the large scale endeavors of Belgian
property tycoons within intelligent (public) urban development schemes. This failure can
be understood as one of the reasons why the urban agglomerations in Belgium never
transformed  into  a  consolidated  metropolitan  area.  Instead,  the  recollection  of  an
underrepresented history of private (mass) housing development revealed a metropolitan
condition that did not result from a long-lasting integrated urbanism, but that can be
understood as a hardly integrated and opportunistic sum of positive externalities that
were occasionally and haphazardly produced in the course of urbanization. In the end,
what  was increasingly lacking in the Antwerp metropolitan region,  was an enduring
planning  culture,  creative  intelligence  and  financial  mechanisms  that  were  able  to
determine and couple desirable externalities to an ambitious overall spatial image-guide.
And this is exactly what is at stake in today’s retrofitting efforts for the twentieth century
belt  of  Antwerp and many other European cities,  where public  ambitions will  highly
depend upon the inventive participation of private capital. (Grafe, et.al., 2014; Upmeyer,
2013).
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Figure 11. The haphazard urbanity of the Antwerp metropolis
Source: VAi_Exhibition CityOutsideTheCity, available at http://www.vai.be/nl/activiteit/tentoonstelling-
stadbuitenstad-tot-76.
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NOTES
1. Term named after Marcel Smets who called the belgian urban condition a banlieue radieuse.
2. The ease with which building violations were accepted suggests the paying of bribes which was
relatively common at the time. We have not been able to positively establish the payment of such
bribes in this case.
ABSTRACTS
In the Belgian context, the production of Public Mass housing remained limited in scope. Apart
from a few well published examples Cité Modèle & Kiel (Braem), Luchtbal (Van Kuyck), Cité de
Droixhe  (Groupe  EGAU),  Belgian  housing  policies  focused  on  the  promotion  of  private
homeownership. Mass housing in Belgium took the form of the massive production of private
houses,  constituting  a  sprawled  urban landscape  that  has  been  described  as  the  ‘banlieue
radieuse’. Less studied is the short lived but quantitatively significant private production of large
scale high-rise apartments. This paper studies the close relationship between the production of
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these very different forms of ‘mass housing’: low- and high rise, inner-city and suburban. While
the  public  policy  context  is  rather  well  known,  the  private  developers  that  produced  this
landscape have hardly been studied. This paper studies major players (Amelinckx n.v., Etrimo
n.v., Extensa n.v.) and the architectural and development models through which they managed
to  create  and  capture  a  vast  market  of  commodified  housing.  Through  the  detailed
reconstruction of large scale commercial  development schemes in Antwerp and Brussels,  the
paper describes the optimism of these mavericks of the Belgian property boom and recollects the
radiant suburban promise they delivered.
Although these property tycoons seem to have had little difficulty in luring in the middle classes
and in persuading local political boards, today it becomes clear that the premises on the basis of
which they sold  the  suburban dream were  imbued with a  thin instantaneous  optimism that
turned out to be too precarious to keep up with the subsequent impact of urbanization. While
their activities are mostly remembered for the trauma of their bankruptcy, affecting many small
contractors and private investors, this paper will highlight the collective failure to embed these
large scale endeavours within enduring and intelligent (public) urban development strategies.
INDEX
Keywords: Belgian Property Boom, Amelinckx, Metropolitan Urbanization
AUTHORS
TOM BROES
University of Ghent, Belgium. Tom.Broes[at]ugent.be
MICHIEL DEHAENE
University of Ghent, Belgium. Michiel.Dehaene[at]ugent.be.
Real Estate Pioneers on the Metropolitan Frontier
Cidades, 33 | 2016
28
